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Editor

TAXATION - DUE PROCESS - MULTI-STATE TAiATION OF
TRANSFERS OF INTANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY AT DEAT.--The
restrictive effect of the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment on multi-state taxation of transfers of intangible personal property at death has undergone considerable fluctuation in
United States Supreme Court decisions. Since 1939 the Court
has followed a policy announced in Curry v. McCanless,' the
scope and direction of which is indicated to some extent in two
"
recent decisions, Graves v. Schmidlapp and State Tax Commission
of Utah v. Aldrich.3 It is the purpose of this note to outline briefly
the history of the law on multi-state taxation of the transfer of
1(1939) 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900, 83 L. Ed. 1339, discussed in
(1939) 24 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 136; (1939) 53 Harv. L. Rev. 68, 69.
"(1942) 315 U. S. 657, 62 Sup. Ct. 870, 86 L. Ed. 761.
rl(1942) ........ U. S.......... 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 86 L. Ed. 911.
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intangible property at death, 4 to indicate the present state of that
law, to point out the current trend and suggest the extent to which
it is likely to be pursued by the Court in the future.
During the first three decades of this century the leading case
on the subject was Blackstone v. Miller,' which was authority for
the proposition that multi-state taxation of the transfer of choses
in action at death does not, in itself, violate the due process clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. After the Blackstone Case, the
bases upon which the Supreme Court sustained multi-state taxation of these transfers were various, and the result was that several
states were permitted to tax the same transfer.6 However, the due
process clause furnished one notable restriction on multi-state
taxation during this era when the doctrine of Blackstone v. Miller
prevailed. In the case of Wachovia Bank and Trust Co. v. Doughton7 the Court decided that the domiciliary state of a donee of a
4

For a complete analysis of the problem of multi-state taxation up to
1931 see Rottschaefer, The Power of the States to Tax Intangibles, (1931)
15 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 741.
5(1903) 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47 L. Ed. 439. This case specifically held, that a New York tax be sustained, where it was imposed on a
transfer at death by an Illinois resident of bank deposits in New York and
personal debts due from residents of New York. At page 204 the Court said,
"No doubt this power on the part of two States to tax on different and more
or less inconsistent principles, leads to some hardship . . . but these inconsistencies infringe no rule of constitutional law." And on page 206, "Power
over the person of the debtor confers jurisdiction, we repeat. And this
being so we perceive no better reason for denying the right of New York
to impose a succession tax on debts owed by its citizens than upon tangible
chattels found within the State at the time of the death. The maxim mobilia
sequuntur personam has no more truth in the one case than in the other.
When logic and the policy of a state conflict with a fiction due to historical
tradition, the fiction must give way."
6For example: The domicile of the decedent, Bullen v. State of Wisconsin, (1916) 240 U. S. 625, 36 Sup. Ct. 473, 60 L. Ed. 830; Blodgett v.
Silberman, (1928) 277 U. S., 1, 48 Sup. Ct. 410, 72 L. Ed. 749; the "power"
argument of Mr. Justice Holmes in Blackstone v. Miller, (1903) 188 U. S.
189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47 L. Ed. 439; physical location of securities within
the state for safekeeping, Wheeler v. Sohmer, (1914) 233 U. S. 434, 34
Sup. Ct. 607, 58 L. Ed. 1030; the state of incorporation as to shares of stock,
the basis discussed in Frick v. Pennsylvania, (1925) 268 U. S. 473, 497,
45 Sup. Ct. 603, 69 L. Ed. 1058, 42 A. L. R. 316 and note; but see Rhode
Island Hospital Trust Company v. Doughton, (1926) 270 U. S. 69, 46 Sup.
Ct. 256, 70 L. Ed. 475, 43 A. L. R. 1374 and note, discussed in (1926) 10
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 632, where the state in which the corporate assets
were situated was not allowed to tax the transfer at death of shares owned
by a non-resident. For a criticism of this situation, see Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota, (1930) 280 U. S. 204, 210, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L. Ed.
371, 65 A. L. R. 1000 and note, discussed in (1930) 14 MINNESOTA LAW
REVIEW 799, "If each State can adopt any one of these [bases for taxation]
and tax accordingly, obviously, the same bonds may be declared present for
taxation in two, or three, or four places at the same moment. Such a
startling possibility suggests a wrong premise."

7(1926) 272 U. S. 567, 47 Sup. Ct. 202, 71 L. Ed. 413.
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power of appointment could not validly tax the exercise of that
power by will where the power was created by a non-resident with
respect to intangibles in another state.
In 1930 the Court adopted an entirely different approach to the
matter and expressly overruled the Blackstone Case in Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota.8 Recognizing the evils and oppressive character of multi-state taxation and the character of modern
business, Mr. Justice MIcReynolds laid down the general principle
that the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limits
the taxation of the transfer of intangibles to the domiciliary state,
with the possible exception of the state of business situs ;o Justices
Holmes and Brandeis dissented."0 The scope of this decision" was
clarified by three subsequent cases. In the case of Baldwin v.
Missouri,x'" the Court applied the doctrine of Farmers' Loan &
Trust Co. v. Minnesota to an attempt by a non-domiciliary state
to tax bank accounts and notes which were present in that state
at the time of decedent's death. Some of these notes were secured
by mortgages on realty within the taxing state, and some were also
notes by debtors domiciled therein. This decision determined that
inheritance taxation based solely on the power of the state over the
debtor is unconstitutional as applied to bank accounts and ordinary
notes, whether or not secured by property within the taxing state. 13
In Bcidler v. South Carolina Tax Commission' 4 immunity from
inheritance taxation by non-domiciliary states was extended to
open accounts. Shortly thereafter, in the case of First National
Bank of Boston v. Maine" the Court decided that the state of
%(1930) 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L. Ed. 371, 65 A. L. R. 1000
and 5note, discussed in (1930) 14 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 799.
'The Farmers Loan & Trust Co. Case specifically determined that
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the state
of the debtor's domicile from placing an inheritance tax on a transfer of
bonds merely on that basis.
"'Mr. Justice Holmes, dissenting, stated at page 216, "It seems to me
that the law of Minnesota is a present force necessary to the existence of
the obligation, and that therefore, however contrary it may be to enlightened
policy, the tax is good."
"See Rottschaefer, The Power of the States to Tax Intangibles,
(1931) 15 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 741, 744.
'"(1930) 281 U. S. 586, 50 Sup. Ct. 436, 74 L. Ed. 1056, 72 A. L. R.
1303 and note.
"Here again, Mr. Justice Holmes' argument in Blackstone v. Miller,
(1903) 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47 L. Ed. 439, and his dissent
in Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, (1930) 280 U. S. 204,
50 Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L. Ed. 371, 65 A. L. R. 1000 and note, discussed in (1930)
14 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 799, is answered and rejected.
"4(1930) 282 U. S. 1, 51 Sup. Ct. 54, 75 L. Ed. 131, discussed in
(1931) 15 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 254.
Ir(1932) 284 U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174, 76 L. Ed. 313, 77 A. L. R.
1401 and note, discussed in (1932) 16 MINNESOTA LAw REVIEW 327.
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a corporation's domicile could not, on that basis alone, tax a transfer at death of corporate shares owned by a non-resident.
In 1939 the Court took another tack on the problem. Its decisions in Curry v. MV1cCanless16 and Graves v. Elliot,17 a companion case, sharply departed from the doctrine of the Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota. In the Curry Case the Court
took the view that where intangibles receive benefit and protection
from the laws of more than one state, each state may levy a tax
on the transfer of such property at death without violating the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.ls Thus the
Court rejected the doctrine that the Fourteenth Amendment precludes multi-state taxation, only nine years after the birth of
that view in the Farmers' Loan & Trust Co. Case.
The decisions in two recent cases, Graves v. Schmidlapp, and
State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich2 0 indicate the purport
of the Curry Case and the possible future of the doctrine expressed
therein. The issue presented in the Graves Case was the same as
in Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. Doughton;2 1 that is, whether

the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment precludes
a state from taxing the exercise, by a domiciled resident, of a
general testamentary power of appointment where the power was
created by a non-resident with respect to intangibles in another
state. By expressly overruling the Wachovia Bank & Trust Co.
Case, the court sustained the constitutional power of the domiciliary
16(1939) 307 U. S. 357, 59 Sup. Ct. 900, 83 L. Ed. 1339, discussed in
(1939) 24 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 136. In this case a resident of Tennessee had created an inter vivos trust by a transfer of stocks and bonds to
an Alabama trustee, reserving a power to dispose of the trust estate by
her will. At the settlor's death the power was exercised in this manner by
appointing the trust res to the same trustee but upon different trusts.
Appeal was taken from a decree of the Supreme Court of Tennessee declaring the property to be subject to succession or transfer taxation by Tennessee but not by Alabama. The United States Supreme Court held, that the
decree of the Tennessee court be reversed so far as it denied the power
of Alabama to tax the transfer.
17(1939) 307 U. S. 383, 59 Sup. Ct. 913, 83 L. Ed. 1356; see (1939)
24 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 136; decided the same day and on the authority
of the5 Curry Case.
' This reasoning is consistent with Mr. Justice Stone's concurring
opinion, and to some extent with Mr. Justice Holmes' dissent in Farmers
Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, (1930) 280 U. S. 204, 50 Sup. Ct. 98, 74 L.
Ed. 371, 65 A. L. R. 1000 and note, discussed in (1930) 14 MINNEsoT' LAW
REVIEW 799. It was also on this basis that Mr. Justice Stone dissented in
Baldwin v. Missouri, (1930) 281 U. S. Sup. Ct. 436, 74 L. Ed. 1056, 72
A. L. R. 1303 and note, and in First National Bank v. Maine, (1932) 284
U. S. 312, 52 Sup. Ct. 174, 76 L. Ed. 313, 77 A. L. R. 1401 and note. discussed in (1932) 16 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 327.
19(1942) 315 U. S. 657, 62 Sup. Ct. 870, 86 L. Ed. 861.
20(1942) ........ U. S .......... 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 86 L. Ed. 911.
21(1926) 272 U. S. 567, 47 Sup. Ct. 202, 71 L. Ed. 413.
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state to impose this tax. The Court took the position that, "For
purposes of estate and inheritance taxation the power to dispose
of property at death is the equivalent of ownership."22 And that,
"Taxation of such enjoyment of the power to dispose of property
is as much within the constitutional power of the state of his
[donee's] domicile as is the taxation of the transfer at death of
intangibles which he owns. ' ' Thus the Court has taken this
opportunity to wipe out the one important exception to multi24
state taxation as it existed in the era of Blackstone v. Miller.
In State Tax Connission of Utah v. Alarich25 a resident of
New York owned and held in New York at the time of his death
four hundred shares of stock in the Union Pacific Railroad, a
Utah corporation. Respondents, executors of the decedent's
estate, obtained a declaratory judgment, affirmed by the Utah
Supreme Court, determining that the transfer at death was not
subject to taxation by Utah. 2 6 On a writ of certiorari, the Supreme
Court reversed the judgment, Justices Jackson and Robert dissenting. The court held that Utah was not precluded by the
Fourteenth Amendment from taxing the transfer at death of
stock in a Utah corporation. In reaching this recision the Court
expressly overruled First National Bank v. Maine.27 So the Court
has now either specifically overturned or rejected the basis of every
impo rtant case decided upon the theory that due process precludes
multi-state taxation, with the sole exception of the Farmers' Loan
& Trust Co. Case. A vigorous criticism of the majority's position is expounded in Mr. Justice Jackson's dissenting opinion. He
points out the fictitious basis of the doctrine of benefit and protection,' s and discusses two other objections to the result reached
by the majority, namely, the friction which ensues between states
and the unjustified discrimination against intangible property in
relation to other forms of wealth. Mr. Justice Jackson predicts
2

2Graves v. Schmidlapp, (1942) 315 U. S. 657, 62 Sup. Ct. 870, 872,
86 L. Ed. 761.
aaGraves v. Schmidlapp, (1942) 315 U. S. 657, 62 Sup. Ct. 870, 874,
86 L. Ed. 761.
'4(1903) 188 U. S. 189, 23 Sup. Ct. 277, 47 L. Ed. 439.
*-5(1942) ........ U. S .......... 62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 86 L. Ed. 911.
26Aldrich v. State Tax Commission, (Utah 1941) 116 P. (2d) 923.
27(1932) 284 U. S. 312, 331, 52 Sup. Ct. 174, 76 L. Ed. 313, 77 A. L. R.
1401 and note, discussed in (1932) 16 MIIESOTA LAW REvIEW 327.
2s(1942)

........

U. S .........

,

62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1015, 86 L. Ed. 911.

"When Utah was admited to statehood in 1896, the Union Pacific Railroad
was already old as a national institution . . . If it had only the 'opportunities' and 'benefits' conferred by Utah and only the properties protected
by her laws, the Union Pacific would cut little figure either in transportation or finance."
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that, "Our tomorrows will witness an extension of the taxing
power of the chartering or issuing state to corporate bonds and
bonds of states and municipalities (by overruling Farmers' Loan
and Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U. S. 204, 50 S. Ct. 98, 74 L.
Ed. 371, 65 A. L. R. 1000), to bank credits for cash deposited
(by overruling Baldwin v. State of Missouri, 281 U. S. 586, 50 S.
Ct. 436, 74 L. Ed. 1056, 72 A. L. R. 1303), and to choses in action
(by overruling Beidler v. South Carolina Tax Comm., 282 U. S.
1, 51 S. Ct. 54, 75 L. Ed. 131.''2 " These predictions concerning
the future of the Baldwin and Beidler Cases seem well justified, as
the doctrine of the Curry Case appears to have already brushed
those two cases aside. His speculation on the Farmers"Loani &
Trust Co. Case is quite appropriate as the present status of this
case is one of the open questions in inheritance taxation today. At
present it still represents the law, as the Court so far has treated
bonds differently from other intangibles.3 If this case is overruled the cycle will be complete and a full restoration of the doctrine of Blackstone v. Miller will have been accomplished. Mr.
Justice-Jackson further suggests that, "... ..since the Due Process

Clause speaks with no more clarity as to tangible than as to
intangible property, the question is opened whether our decisions
as to taxation of tangible property are not due to be overhauled."'
This argument seems to amount more to a reductio ad absurdum
than to a serious suggestion, as the principles of "situs"" have too
long governed the taxation of tangibles to be likely to be rejected
on the "benefit and protection" doctrine.
It is suggested that the Court may continue to treat bonds
differently and allow the Farmers'Loan & Trust Co. Case to remain an exception, or it may overrule that case and make a complete return to the doctrine of Blackstone v. Miller, but they are
not likely to go further and disturb the law of taxation of tangibles on
this reasoning.
29State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich, (1942) ........
U. S ..........
62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1021, 86 L. Ed. 911.
3oSee Rottschaefer, The Power of the States to Tax Intangibles, (1931)
15 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW 741.

31(1942) ........
U. S .........
62 Sup. Ct. 1008, 1021, 86 L. Ed. 911.
32 Frick v. Pennsylvania, (1925) -268 U. S. 473, 45 Sup. Ct. 603, 69
L.Ed. 1058, 42 A. L. R. 316 and note.

